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Michael Leicht* 
Trade Policy and Human Rights 
This year's International Labour Conference from 2nd to 18th June adopted 
a declaration of principles concerning fundamental workers' rights. What can the 
World Trade Organisation do to help establish these rights, and what economic 
effects can be expected? 
T he link between trade and labour standards is probably one of the most controversial issues in 
the current trade debate. Although this discussion has 
a long history' the debate has heated up in recent 
years. After years of scepticism by developing 
countries with regard to free trade, now developed 
countries are afraid that free trade could destabilise 
their democracies. The fast integration of developing 
countries into the world economy after the end of the 
Cold War has fostered fears that the Western 
democracies could lose out in global competition. 
Poor developing countries might not think about 
the long-term consequences of their actions. And 
authoritarian regimes and dictatorships are only 
interested in their own well-being, in exploiting their 
people and the environment. Social and ecological 
dumping is the consequence. Therefore the Western 
World has striven to address the issues of social and 
environmental standards in the context of the WTO. In 
Marrakech, by signing the WTO treaty, all the 
members have agreed to set up a committee on trade 
and the environment. But the most controversial 
question, the one of human rights, has been left open. 
At the first ministerial meeting of the WTO in 
Singapore, from 9th to 13th December 1996, the USA, 
with the support of some EU countries and Norway, 
wanted to set up a WTO working party to discuss the 
issue of social standards and its impact on world 
trade. But strong resistance from developing 
countries and from business organisations lead to the 
meagre conclusion in the final declaration "that the 
WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing 
collaboration". At the second ministerial meeting in 
Geneva, from 18th to 20th May 1998, no further 
progress on the issue could be made. 
In the following we will look at the theoretical 
relationship between trade policy and human rights. 
To develop the trade agenda three essential questions 
must be dealt with: 
[] are human rights universal values or are they 
something exclusively European? 
[] are human rights and labour standards a luxury 
good or does respecting them help development? 
[] and correlated, is free trade the best way for their 
promotion or can sanctions help? 
We will answer the last two questions first and then 
come back to the more fundamental question about 
the universality of human rights. 
Trade Policy and Labour Standards 
The protracted rise in unemployment in many 
industrialised countries and in wage inequality in 
some countries (especially the USA) has led some 
observers to look for external explanations, including 
claims of unfair trade practice associated with 
competition from firms that allegedly base their 
comparative advantage on low labour standards. This 
view is charlenged by those who see technorogical 
change in connection with internal structural rigidities 
as the key factors for unemployment. Low social 
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standards and labour costs are, on the other hand, in 
their view the only comparative advantage developing 
countries have. 
The debate has focused on the human rights' 
dimension of certain labour standards. It is argued 
that some labour standards reflect basic human rights 
and that every country in the world should therefore 
adhere to those standards. This position firmly rules 
out any discussion on salary differentials. 
'Core' labour standards are defined as: freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, elimination of 
exploitative forms of child labour, prohibition of forced 
labour and non-discrimination in employment. These 
are called 'core' labour standards because their effect 
on economic efficiency is neutral or positive 
regardless of the level of development of an economy. 
Therefore core labour standards may be distinguished 
from those not in the core by the fact that the latter are 
a function of development while the former are not? 
From an economic point of view, it can be argued 
that the improved enforcement of non-discrimination 
standards and prohibition of forced labour might raise 
economic efficiency by ensuring that the allocation of 
labour resources moves closer to a free-market 
situation. The conditions of forced labour eliminate 
the ability of workers to make choices about where, 
when and under what conditions they will supply their 
labour. And under discrimination some individuals 
may not end up employed in the jobs to which they 
are best suited. The result of both is market 
distortion? 
The economic effects of freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining depend on a 
variety of factors. On the one hand, these rights can 
increase workers' motivation and productivity. On the 
other hand, they can introduce a new distortion into 
the market if unionised workers succeed in raising 
their wages and working conditions above market 
levels and keeping competitors out. The net outcome 
on economic efficiency depends on the relative 
importance of these two effects. Empirical research 
done by the OECD '~ suggests that there is no 
correlation between real-wage growth and the degree 
of observance of freedom-of-association rights. 5 
2 K.A. Swinner ton :  An Essay on Economic Efficiency and Core 
Labour Standards, The World Economy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997, p. 74. 
3 Ibid., pp. 76-78. 
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The exploitation of child labour is likely to 
undermine long-term economic prospects to the 
extent that it hampers children's education 
opportunities and degrades their health and welfare. 
But in this case development considerations must 
also be taken into account. Education opportunities 
are partly a luxury good. On the other hand, children 
are often sent to work out of short-term interests or 
cultural prejudices (e.g. women don't need education) 
even though schooling is available. Finally, there is no 
evidence to suggest that low-standard countries 
enjoy a better global export performance. 6
The central message is therefore clear: 
[] those labour standards that embody basic human 
rights can stimulate economic development and are 
therefore in the interest of all workers (and countries) 
in the world; 
[] observance of these labour standards could 
neutralise protectionist pressures, thus securing 
support for free trade. 
At this year's International Labour Conference from 
2nd to 18th June this message was heard. 
Responding to the request of the WTO Singapore 
Ministerial Conference to act in the area of labour 
standards, the representatives from the ILO member 
states have adopted a declaration of principles 
concerning fundamental workers' rights together with 
a new ILO convention aiming at eliminating extreme 
forms of child labour. And they have also approved a 
follow-up mechanism. It is hoped that the new 
declaration on fundamental workers' rights can help 
'core' labour standards to be respected world-wide. 
The declaration builds on already internationally 
accepted ILO conventions. It should foster respect of 
the four principles of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining (convention nos. 87 and 98), 
prohibition of forced labour (convention nos. 29 and 
105), elimination of child labour (convention nos. 138), 
and non-discrimination in employment (convention 
nos. 100 and 111). All seven conventions have been 
ratified so far in only 36 countries. But the adoption of 
the declaration on fundamental workers' rights by the 
International Labour Conference (the supreme 
But A Baner j i  and H. Ghanem (Does the Type of Political 
Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Policies?, in: The World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 11, January, 1997, p.188) find that 
authoritarian regimes that did not respect freedom of association 
tended to be linked with policies restricting trade and distorting 
labour markets. And on the other hand, the granting of rights like 
freedom of association can foster the transition to democracy. 
'~ The OECD study Trade, Employment and Labour Standards (op. 
cit.) gives an analytical and empirical analysis of all relevant aspects. 
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deliberative body of the ILO) means that the ILO's 174 
member states, including all the members of the 
WTO, recognise their duty to observe these principles 
whether or not they have formally adhered to the 
corresponding international labour conventions. Thus, 
the adoption of the ILO declaration represents a small 
breakthrough. It can be understood as "the first 
universal recognition that the globalised economy 
must rest on ground rules designed to promote social 
justice and human dignity". 7 But the problem lies in 
the weak enforcement mechanism. The ILO only has 
a monitoring system and no binding enforcement 
mechanism. 
Promotion of Human Rights 
Which strategy is best to promote human rights 
and democracy? 8 Which is the best forum for 
promoting labour standards and human rights? And 
which are the best means? Some, like Barro, 9 argue 
that economic development promotes democracy, 
while others claim this regularity is simply a chance 
by-product of the fact that countries with democratic 
political cultures industrialised first. If democracy is 
simply another element of social and economic 
development, then our policy toward countries with 
authoritarian regimes should embrace free trade to 
foster the process of economic development, thereby 
hastening the eventual replacement of authoritarian 
regimes with more democratic successors. By 
contrast, if democracy is not a by-product of 
economic and social development, promoting free 
trade may not be the route to free elections and 
respect of human rights. 
Londregan and Poole '~ find that higher income 
promotes the emergence of democratic political 
institutions, but the democratising effects of high 
income are modest. And Przeworski and Limongi" 
' Michel Hansenne,  direetorgenera[ of the ILO, quoted in the 
International Herald Tribune, 4/6/98. 
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Legacies and Foreign Affairs, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 205-235. 
9 R. J. Barro :  Democracy and Growth, in: Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. I, March 1996, pp. 1-27. 
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come to the conclusion that democracy is not a by- 
product of economic development, but can be 
initiated at any level of development. More wealth only 
increases the survival chances of a young democracy. 
Therefore political conditionality can foster the 
transition to democracy. From this perspective, the 
EU has done well to impose human rights clauses in 
all its cooperation agreements and to provide legal 
bases for sanctions. '2 But to secure the coherence of 
the multilateral trading system, unilateral measures 
should be kept to an absolute minimum. Therefore, 
actions to promote 'core' labour standards, 
representing human rights, should take place within 
the framework of the WTO. 
Important in this regard are the potential effects of 
sanctions. These are ambiguous. On the one hand 
they can support the ruling dictatorship, because the 
scarce resources the government can control are 
becoming more valuable. On the other hand sanctions 
(sometimes the threat is enough) can trigger political 
change. Using an interest group model we can 
distinguish essentially four different factors: on the 
material level we have to distinguish the relative effect 
of the embargo on the income of the different groups, 
and whether government supporting groups are hurt 
more by the sanctions than the opposition or vice 
versa. On the psychological evel, we must distinguish 
between a 'rally around the flag' reaction, a 'signal of 
foreign support' and a 'discouraged rent-seeker 
effect'. 'Rallying around the flag' or 'laager mentality' 
means that people are standing closer together to 
face the common threat from outside. But the 
opposite can also happen: sanctions signalling 
foreign support can strengthen the opposition and 
reduce free-riding. People who have supported the 
government may cease to do so because they 
anticipate a reversal of power. '3 
Empirical studies analysing all major sanction 
cases since World War Two show that they have been 
' A. P rzeworsk i  and E L imong i :  Modernization-Theories 
and Facts. in: World Politics, Vol. 49, January 1997, pp. 155-183. 
,2 D. J. Marant i s :  Human Rights, Democracy, and Development: 
The European Community Model, in: Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
Vol. 7, Spring 1994, pp. 1-32. 
'~ W. H. Kaempfer  and A. D. Lowenberg :  International 
Economic Sanctions - A Public Choice Perspective, Boulder 1992, 
pp, 115-135; and Analyzing Economic Sanctions: Towards a Public 
Choice Framework, in: Odel l  and Wi l le t t  (eds.): International 
Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and 
Political Science, Ann Arbor, 1993, pp.182-189. Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg base their analysis on a model developed by G. S. 
Becker :  A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influance, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, 1983, 
pp. 371-400; and Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight 
Costs, in: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 28, 1985, pp. 329-347. 
successful in one third of all cases." The probability of 
success of sanctions is the highest if the target 
country is small and there is political unrest, the 
sanction period is relatively short and the former trade 
linkage was high. 's 
We can conclude that democracy and respect of 
human rights are not linked to economic 
development. And sanctions, even though ambiguous 
in their effect, can help to promote the respect of 
human rights and labour standards. Therefore political 
conditionality of trade is justified. But to secure the 
coherence of the multilateral trading system actions 
should take place within the framework of the W-I-O. 
Universal Human Rights or Cultural Relativism? 
Finally, there is the philosophical discussion as to 
whether human rights and democracy are universal 
values or whether they are something exclusively 
European. President Jiang Zemin, for example, 
claimed at a US-Chinese summit that "concepts on 
democracy, on human rights, and on freedoms are 
relative". "6 Proponents of the cultural relativist point of 
view see cultures as closed entities, best symbolised 
by the image of a globe (e.g. Herder). But a more 
accurate description of a culture (reflecting the 
multifarious intracultural variances and intercultural 
invariances) is the concept of 'bricolage' (C.-L. 
Strauss). Cultures are no longer seen as completely 
juxtaposed to one another, completely incommensur- 
able, but more as flowing over into one another, 
expressing different facets to a different degree." 
Such a metaphor is open for the various cultural 
invariants - l ike human rights. 
The idea of democracy and human rights is nothing 
specifically European. The problem of just rule has 
bothered mankind since human existence. In the 'Epic 
of Gilgamesh', dating back to the third millennium 
before our time, we find the following warning to 
Gilgamesh, the great king of Uruk: "But do not abuse 
this power, deal justly with your servants in the palace, 
deal justly before (the god, the sun) Shamesh". '8 And 
' G.C. Hufbauer ,  J.J. Schot t  and A. K. E l l i o t t :  Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered - History and Current Policy, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington D.C. 1990. 
'~ P. v. Berge i j k :  Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial 
Policy: Positive and Negative Sanctions in a New World Order, 
Aldershot 1994, pp. 71-97. 
" Cf. International Herald Tribune 31/10/97. 
,7 E. H ol e n st ei n : Kulturphilosophische Perspektiven, Frankfurt 
1998, pp. 268, 326. 
'~ The Epic of Gilgamesh, London 1972, p. 70. 
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Confucianism is not hostile to human rights, as the 
present Chinese dictators would like to have us 
believe. On the contrary, Mengzi (-372 to -281), the 
'second genius' and successor of Confucius, 
developed the idea that each man has his self-dignity. 
Everyone has a sense of justice and the inborn 
capacity to distinguish between good and bad. Rulers 
therefore have a moral duty to respect their people. All 
men have a heart xin, which does not allow them to 
accept the suffering of others. Whoever does not have 
a feeling of right and wrong is not a human being. The 
feeling of sympathy is the starting point of humanity 
ren?  9 And in Indian culture the Mahabharata lays 
foundations for the respect of human rights. Rulers 
should protect their people with all their means? ~ 
Very interesting is the case of the League of the 
Iroquois founded in the first half of the 15th century 
and uniting peacefully all Iroquois in a confederation. 
All adult men and women elected and deposed its 
sachem (leaders of the league), chiefs and Keepers of 
the Faith. "All the members of an Iroquois gens were 
personally free, [...] they were equal in privileges and 
in personal rights, the sachem and chiefs claiming no 
superiority. TM 
These examples should be enough to show that 
roots for the respect of human rights can also be 
found in non-European cultures. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We have seen that human rights are a truly 
universal concept. Non-western cultures also 
encourage the respect of human rights. Their 
promotion does not depend on the level of 
development. Respect of 'core' labour standards is 
neutral or raises economic efficiency. And political 
conditionality and sanctions can foster the respect of 
human rights and labour standards. 
If core labour standards enhance economic 
efficiency, the obvious question is: why are they not 
observed world-wide? Poverty and dictatorial or 
authoritarian regimes make the respect of these 
human rights difficult. Short-term interests and rent- 
seeking predominate. Therefore the international 
enforcement of core labour standards is needed and 
would in the long term be beneficial (i.e. developing 
countries will benefit, thanks to higher growth, and 
developed countries will benefit from more exports 
and less social dumping). Short-term losers will be 
consumers from developed countries, who might 
have to pay a slightly higher price, and especially the 
rent-seeking ruling class from developing countries 
who exploit their people. We therefore agree with 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern 22 when they write: 
"... World welfare is best served by eliminating market 
failures where they exist, and the labour market is no 
exception. To the extent that labour standards are the 
appropriate remedy, then national governments 
should certainly enact them .... But a breakdown in 
the political process may prevent governments from 
enacting legislation that corrects market failure." This 
is the decisive point. Because of very incomplete 
political markets in developing countries, 
characterised mostly by dictatorships, autocracies 
and oligarchies, the interests of the working poor are 
normally not taken into account. 
"Countervailing may be justified if labour standards 
that are necessary for efficient resource allocation 
have not been enacted. In this case, the absence of 
labour standards could depress the wages of 
unskilled workers world-wide. ''23 Imperfect political 
markets in developing countries preventing the 
respecting of 'core' labour standards give rise to 
problems of social dumping. To prevent this, 
international enforcement mechanisms should be 
created using both positive and negative measures. 
First positive measures in the form of aid 
programmes and technical assistance, e.g. through 
the ILO, should have priority. But when this fails to 
help and a country continually violates core labour 
standards (and thereby reduces world efficiency 
through social dumping) negative measures are also 
necessary. In this regard the ILO conventions and the 
new declaration on fundamental workers' rights are 
no more than a starting point. This is because the ILO 
has no binding enforcement mechanism, but can only 
make public recommendations. But the new ILO 
declaration on fundamental workers' rights could be 
used as internationally accepted criteria for whether 
sanctions should be enacted or not. The new 
declaration covers all four aspects of 'core' labour 
'" H. R o et z: Die Chinesische Ethik tier Acnsenzeit, Frankfurt 1992, 
p. 322; Konfuzius, M0nchen 1995, p. 102; and Konfuzius und die 
W~rde des Menschen, in: Die Zeit, No. 47, 15.11. 1996, pp. 12-13. 
2o The Mahabharata, The Asanusasana Parva - The 13th Book, 
Section XXXII, Calcutta, pp. 167-170. 
2~ L. Morgan:  League of the Hoae'qosaunee or iroquois, 
Rochester 1851; and Ancient Society, London 1877, pp. 84-86. 
2~ D. K. Brown,  A.V. Deardor f f  and R M. S tern ,  op. cir., 
pp. 270-271. 
" Ibid., p, 272. 
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standards (freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, elimination of exploitative forms of child 
labour, prohibition of forced labour and non- 
discrimination in employment) and was accepted by 
all 174 ILO member states (including all the members 
of the WTO) at the International Labour Conference in 
Geneva from 18th to 20th May 1998. 
The crucial question now from the point of view of 
political economy is, whether interventions to 
counterbalance inefficiencies in the political market in 
developing countries might not be counter- 
productive? 
First, declining industries in rich industrial countries 
could try to use the weapon of sanctions for 
protectionist purposes. But it should be possible to 
prevent this by means of a rigid procedure. An 
independent WTO body, in collaboration with the ILO, 
could survey the respecting of labour standards 
(comparable to the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, TPRM). Alternatively the monitoring 
could take place under ILO guidance. The 
International Labour Conference has agreed on a new 
monitoring system for the implementation of its 
declaration on fundamental workers' rights. But 
irrespective of how monitoring of respect for 'core' 
labour standards is done, in the case of prolonged 
major violations of human rights and fruitless 
warnings sanctions should be used as a measure of 
last resort. ~ 
Second, sanctions might not always be successful. 
But seeing the political process as an imperfect 
market 2s sanctions can be the decisive moment in 
changing the political equilibrium and triggering 
political change. Hufbauer et al. 26 give the empirical 
evidence for the effectiveness of sanctions. 
Nevertheless WTO/ILO surveillance should continue 
and in the case of the evident malfunctioning of 
sanctions they should be stopped. 
Unfortunately, the last two WTO ministerial 
meetings in Singapore and Geneva were not very 
helpful in this regard. In Singapore it was decided that 
the issue of labour standards remains a matter for the 
ILO and the possibility for sanctions has been ruled 
out. But in Geneva this summer both President 
" OECD: Trade and Labour Standards, OECD Working Papers, 
No. 7, VoL IV, 1996, pp. 11-12, 
;5 For the political process as a market see G. S. Becker ,  op. cit., 
and for the long term persistance of inefficient institutions see 
D. C. Nor th :  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge 1990. 
:'~ G.C. Hufbauer  et al.,op, cit. 
Clinton and President Santer again stressed the 
importance of the issue of labour standards?' 
Therefore this political momentum could be used to 
introduce at least an internationally observed 'social- 
label'. Labels can improve the information available to 
consumers and thus enable them to make better 
choices. 
Another path which can be pursued - lacking 
multilateral agreements - is the political conditionality 
of development aid and of guarantees for 
multinationals. For example, the EU, by withdrawing 
Burma's European trade privileges, has actually for 
the first time given life to the social clause. Core 
labour standards need to be promoted in the many 
economic agreements negotiated and operated by 
the EU with third parties? 8 As Human Rights Watch 
demands, the EU should condition guarantees and 
subsidies to companies in third countries on respect 
for, and the promotion of, human rights. Further, 
initiatives for more corporate social responsibility and 
codes of conduct for multinational enterprises should 
be fostered. 29 
In today's globalising world economy free trade is 
the best policy in the long run. But there are significant 
short-term adjustment costs causing legitimacy 
problems. There is a perception that not everyone is 
sharing equally in the benefits of free trade. Workers 
in certain sectors think that their jobs are under threat 
from imports from countries allowing unfair working 
practices. Therefore in the case of market failure (e.g. 
labour standards), or what Sir Leon Brittan calls the 
'moral implications of globalisation'? ~ global inter- 
ventions and rules are necessary to prevent a 
resurgence of protectionism. 
2, "We must do more to make sure that this new economy lifts living 
standards around the world, and that spirited economic competition 
among nations never becomes a race to the bottom in environmental 
protections, consumer protections and labour standards. We should 
level up, not level down. Without such a strategy, we cannot build the 
necessary public support for the global economy. Working people will 
assume the risks of a free international market if they have the 
confidence that this system will work for them." President 
B. C l in ton ,  president of the United States, at the WTO Geneva 
ministerial meeting, 18 May 1998. 
29 B. Jo rdan ,  general secretary, International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), making a statement on 'Labour rights: 
international instruments and their application' before the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Subcommittee on 
Human Rights in a public hearing on the social clause, 'Human Rights 
Promotion or Protectionism?', in Brussels, 17 and 18 June 1997. 
R. D icker ,  Associate Counsel and Director, Corporations and 
Human Rights Programme, Human Rights Watch making a statement 
on 'Human Rights and the activities of Multinational Enterprises' in 
a public hearing on the social clause, in Brussels, 17 and 18 
June 1997. 
Sir L. B r it t a n : Globalisation: Responding to New Political and 
Moral Challanges, World Economic Forum, Davos, 30 January 1997. 
1 76 INTERECONOMICS, July/August 1998 
